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Outside Powers: The Moral Economy of Anti-Financial 
Movements 1870-1930 and Today 
Sascha Münnich ∗ 
Abstract: »Fremde Mächte. Die Moralökonomie von Anti-Finanzbewegungen 
1870 bis 1930 und heute«. This article discusses if European societies witness a 
“new Polanyian moment,“ in which a period of austerity and currency turmoil 
will be answered by conservative or authoritarian counter-movements, as hap-
pened in the first half of the 20th century. In order to analyze when and how 
critique that aims at social change is rooted in anti-liberal ideology, we analyze 
the moral economy of the 2011 Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement and 
compare it to anti-financial protest in the late 19th and early 20th century in 
Germany and the UK. We argue that public statements by OWS groups and 
their supporters reproduce two major elements of 19th century moral economy 
of financial protest: First, a description of finance as something external and 
hostile to the traditional socio-cultural community of production. Second, the 
image that financial interests are likely to capture political power. Beyond 
these continuities, we argue that today the dichotomy between “cosmopolitan 
finance” and the “productive national community” is much less clearly con-
nected to sectoral, socio-economic, or ethnic cleavages. Instead, financial out-
siders are perceived as having removed themselves voluntarily from the com-
munity in order to gain profits. Still, we conclude that because of the semantic 
similarities between past and recent anti-finance protest, right-wing populism 
in Europe may not necessarily be weakened by popular anti-austerity protests. 
Keywords: Moral economy, financial markets, social movements, history of po-
litical thought, financial crisis, legitimacy. 
1.  The Next Polanyian Moment?  
Recently, the social and political fate of global financial capitalism has increas-
ingly been brought into comparison with the first wave of global finance, 
which dates back to the period from roughly 1850 until the Great Depression of 
the 1930s (Blyth 2013; Bordo and James 2014; Neal 2009; Woodruff 2016). 
Economic and social historians have stressed the role of financial turmoil for 
the instability of political regimes at the dusk of 19th century colonialism. 
Among them most prominently, Karl Polanyi pointed to the desperate accounts 
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of European governments to meet the prerequisites of the gold standard, lead-
ing many of them to a hazardous policy of austerity and deflation and paving 
the way for European Fascism. Polanyi argued that, while 19th century liberal-
ism was a planned top-down rupture of social and cultural institutions, political 
“counter-movements” spontaneously emerged, from all different ideological 
camps. They fought for institutions that would be able to slow down the com-
modification of labor and moderate the dis-embedding of the market economy 
(Polanyi 1944, 149).  
Polanyi described how over the course of the 1920s, counter-movements to 
the free market became increasingly entangled within nationalist, racist, and 
militaristic ideological frameworks. International liberal and financial interests 
were blended into a major ideological reference point, a pars pro toto for the 
destructive powers of capitalism. The gold standard was the “the only remain-
ing pillar of the traditional world economy” (ibid., 20) for the sake of which 
devastating social disruptions were accepted. “The repayment of foreign loans 
and the return to stable currencies were recognized as the touchstones of ra-
tionality in politics; and no private suffering, no infringement of sovereignty, 
was deemed too great a sacrifice for the recovery of monetary integrity” (ibid., 
142). Polanyi interpreted both right-wing movements of the 1920s and 30s, as 
well as the New Deal in the U.S., as collectivist counter-movements that were 
not “due to any other cause than the manifestation of the weaknesses and perils 
inherent in a self-regulating market system” (ibid., 149).  
Some scholars have grappled with the question if the recent political dynam-
ics in many European countries actually fit the idea of a second “Polanyian 
moment” (Gemici 2016; Levien and Paret 2012). Moreover, recent social pro-
testing could be considered a counter-movement to the renaissance of liberal-
ism and financial capitalism in Europe since the 1980s and 90s. In parallel to 
late 19th and early 20th century, Europe’s recent banking crisis has been trans-
formed into a sovereign debt and, eventually, a currency crisis (Blyth 2013). 
These multiple crises triggered the return of full-scale austerity policies in the 
Southern European countries, which brought smoldering cleavages between 
and within EU countries to the forefront (Armingeon, Guthmann and Weis-
stanner 2016). There is evidence that neoliberalism has lost much of its popu-
larity in the last decades (Levien and Paret 2012). There is also a clearly ob-
servable process of re-nationalization of European politics since the financial 
crisis of 2008 (Streeck 2014). National political decisions are becoming in-
creasingly isolated nation-oriented, with the “Brexit” vote being only the latest 
peak. Finally, populist right-wing parties and movements have gained strength 
in Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria, or even 
gained office in Poland and Hungary.  
Much has been written about the economic and institutional commonalities 
between the two waves of global financial turmoil (Streeck 2013; Bordo and 
James 2014) and the recent emergence of anti-liberal social movements (Della 
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Porta 2015; Peterson, Wahlstrom and Wennerhag 2015). Still, we do not see 
many contributions that have turned to Polanyi’s more theoretical stance on the 
causal relations between public critique or protest and political-institutional 
change in order to make sense of these observations. There are two conceptual 
aspects in Polanyi’s work that could be of help here: First, the recent renais-
sance of protectionism and nationalism may be described as a spontaneous 
Polanyian counter-movement to financial liberalism and market-protecting 
austerity measures, which defies previous ideological cleavages. Second, it is 
important to remember that Polanyi stressed how counter-movements very 
often referred to older, embedded forms of economic organization in their 
critique of liberalization – rather than referring to new and modern policy prin-
ciples. His account of the crises of the early 20th century reminds us that there 
is no reason to believe that counter-movements will necessarily be ideological-
ly progressive. In fact, in this article I will show that to a certain degree, recent 
anti-finance protesting after the credit crunch of 2008, precisely the 2011 inter-
national Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement, reproduced 19th century and 
early 20th century patterns of financial critique, which had been used by con-
servative and radical right-wing parties. This points to an important aspect of 
the conceptual question raised in this special issue, which is how critique and 
social change are intertwined: Public critique that drives social and political 
change may be shaped by historically stable semantic understandings from the 
past, which puts an element of resilience into the very heart of change. There-
fore, I will add a historical dimension to analyzing the critique in the course of 
the financial crisis in this volume (see Dosdall and Rom-Jensen 2107). 
In this article, I will examine semantic similarities between the moral econ-
omy of the global OWS movement and the financial critique that emerged 
between 1890 and 1930 in capitalist countries. I will do this by examining and 
interpreting the argumentative patterns used by OWS groups to publicly criti-
cize the financial industry in the fall of 2011, which was the historical peak of 
street-level anti-finance protest. We will see that anti-finance critique draws 
semantical boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate forms of profit that 
are inevitably linked to broader framings of collective identity. In these pro-
cesses, symbolic boundaries between insiders and outsiders of the economic 
community are implied.  
There are two perceptions that have been important for early 20th century 
anti-finance protesting and re-emerged in 2011 OWS protesting: (1) the appropri-
ation of socially produced value by financial actors who are seen as “outsiders” 
who do not feel solidarity with the economic community; and (2) over-
proportionate political power of financial interests at the expense of the popular 
will. I will show that even though both historical elements of 19th century and 
early 20th century anti-finance moral economy are reproduced in recent OWS 
statements, there are important differences in how the moral economy framings 
of recent anti-financial protest were aligned to collective identities in 2011. 
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2.  The Moral Economy of Anti-Finance Movements 
Which role do norms and cognitions play for the explanation of social move-
ment activities? The relationship between, on the one hand, class structures, 
resources, and windows of opportunity for the formation of a social movement, 
as well as normative and cognitive ideas on the other hand, is far from being 
simple. Framing analysis in social movement research has shown that protest-
ers should not be “viewed merely as carriers of extant ideas and meanings that 
grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or 
existing ideologies” (Benford and Snow 2000, 613). Instead, the creation of a 
social movement always involves framing processes, which are entangled 
within collective identity building. 
Superficially, anti-finance protests after the financial crisis of 2008 may 
suggest a return of class-based political protesting. Many studies have shown 
that this is not true. Economically deprived people, who had lost their jobs or 
houses in the crisis, did not form the majority of protesters. Instead, researchers 
point towards the diffuse socio-economic background of OWS protesters (Cal-
houn 2013; Décieux and Nachtwey 2014). The average education of protesters 
was higher than for the overall population, with the age being significantly 
lower. Moreover, even though most protesters described themselves as leaning 
towards social-democratic or leftist parties (Bergan Draege, Chironi and della 
Porta 2016), there is also a high number of non-party-affiliated protesters. 
OWS shared these socio-demographic similarities with other recent anti-
austerity movements in Europe (Della Porta 2015, 151).  
Even from a resource-oriented movement research perspective, OWS seems 
to be strongly dependent on broadly applicable framings for mobilization. 
OWS protest began in 2011, three years after the public discussion of the huge 
bail out measures following the Lehman crash. There was no particular politi-
cal window of opportunity in the field of financial market regulation, and the 
undoubtedly important Southern European austerity measures were not the 
topic center of OWS protest. Many authors point toward the Arab spring 
movement as a cross-fertilization for OWS (Kraushaar 2012; Della Porta 
2015), but all of them agree on the crucial role of social media platforms such 
as Adbusters for creating the subjective need for action among protesters. 
Moreover, not many ‘classical’ organizational resources, e.g. by parties or 
NGOs, were involved in forming the movement. OWS had many characteris-
tics of a “dramatic performance” (Calhoun 2013, 35) that deviated from all 
well-established and traditional forms of organized protest (Geiges 2014). 
Thus, OWS mobilization relied heavily on processes of collective identity 
building, the construction of a shared “sense of indignation” (Calhoun 2013, 
28) among the “99%”.  
There is some compelling research on the OWS protest framings. For exam-
ple, della Porta describes the attitudes of protesters as a combination of high 
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distrust in current elites and a remarkable high general trust in democratic 
institutions, which are regarded as potentially “freeable” from corruption 
(2015, 155). In their mixed-methods analysis of blog entries by Adbusters and 
tactical briefings of OWS, Kern and Nam show that the protests were primarily 
targeting government and corporations for their “monied corruption” (2013, 
203ff.), with “democracy” and “solidarity” as key value commitments. Their 
analysis refers to the concept of “artistic critique” by Boltanski and Chiapello 
(2005) to sum up OWS critique as centered around a fear of a “corporatocracy,” 
as well as a loss of individual freedom.  
However, in any analysis that focuses on explicit normative attitudes and 
values, the question how boundaries between the ‘good’ and the ‘evil’ aspects 
of capitalism are cognitively drawn is underrated. In the eyes of protesters: 
When does profit seeking practically turn into greed? When exactly does a 
market economy with large corporations turn into a “corporatocracy” and be-
come a threat to democracy? To answer that question, we need to look at the 
cognitive blueprints of a “just economic order,” which protesters refer to in 
their criticism of the status quo. By that, we can explain how it was possible for 
protesters to attack corrupted elites without the need to demand a revolution of 
the economic and social order as a whole. In his concept of “moral economy,” 
E.P. Thompson offers a theoretical framework for analyzing which economic 
practices street-level protesters considered to be ‘just.’ In a study of medieval 
food riots, Thompson claimed that protest movements are not just emotional 
upheavals caused by grief, hunger, or instantaneous anger. Instead, they em-
bodied a “popular consensus as to what were legitimate and what were illegiti-
mate practices in marketing, milling, baking, etc.” (1971, 76-7). There is a 
hidden idea of “legitimate economic practices” in the perception of protesters 
that helps them address their concerns concretely and identify target actors and 
practices. 
Thompson’s concept draws our attention to the insight that there is nothing 
“natural” about placing the anger about the present state of the political system 
and an increasingly unjust economic distribution at the doorsteps of Wall Street 
or the Cities of London and Frankfurt. With that target, OWS movements dif-
fered from long-term broader activities by networks such as the anti-
globalization movement or ATTAC, who have criticized contemporary capital-
ist societies for their lack of democracy and justice since the dawning of glob-
alization. In the OWS movement, the broader political issues were closely 
linked with the assumption that particular finance and banking practices play a 
pivotal role for the problems of contemporary capitalist societies. This was 
symbolized not only in the movement’s name, but also in the protesters’ origi-
nal aim to physically occupy Wall Street. Deflected by police, they ended up 
camping in New York Zuccotti Park, which was chosen because of its proximi-
ty to Wall Street, allowing for daily symbolic protest walks to the New York 
HSR 42 (2017) 3  │  128 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) at its opening and closing time (Calhoun 2013, 31). 
As Frances Piven wrote, 
The Occupyers had simply named Wall Street as the heart of the system, the 
target of their protests, and therefore the place we should all occupy. The truth 
of that was inescapable. (2012, 62) 
However, to concentrate public critique of capitalism on money, debt, or capi-
tal interest evokes historical ideological debates of the 1920s and 30s. There-
fore, we will examine to which degree the Occupy movement shared a moral 
economy with the historical anti-finance protest.  
Such a historical comparison will also pave the way for a conceptual inno-
vation of the sociology of justification towards movement research. The six (or 
seven) ideal-typical worlds of justification in the works Boltanski, Thévenot, 
and Chiapello (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) 
are not sufficient to capture the justificatory discourses about financial capital-
ism. Instead, we have to understand worlds of justification as historically 
grown “repertoires of evaluation” (Lamont and Thévenot 2013) that involve 
more detailed “road maps” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 11) for protest. For 
criticism of banks and financial investors there is a special semantic structure 
involved that shows cognitive resilience over time beyond calls for social 
change. Still, the creation of a social movement is never a purely value-rational 
process of defining ‘good’ and ‘evil’ economic practices cognitively. From a 
sociological point of view, it is important to consider that protest frames have 
to resonate with collective identities (Alexander 2006; Kern and Nam 2013, 
199). Collective identities are built around a sense of “We-ness,” in which 
boundaries between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ are defined. In a process of frame align-
ment, individual thinking and collective frames are brought into congruence 
(Snow et al. 1986, 464). This makes it possible to not only define particular 
economic practices as ‘good’ or ‘evil,’ but also to treat particular actions or 
actors as ‘belonging’ or ‘not belonging’ to the community. As Jeffrey Alexan-
der has pointed out, the definition of ‘evil’ is not the absence of values, but a 
particular constructive process that is essential for defining and maintaining 
social values (Alexander 2006, 109ff.). We will see that (1) cognitive elements 
of the 19th century are repeated in OWS protesting, but (2) there are differ-
ences between then and now concerning which type of collective identities 
carry the protest framing.  
3.  Anti-Financial Critique of Capitalism in History 
What defined the moral economy of financial protest in 19th and 20th century 
European countries? There are roots of popular criticism of capitalism that can 
be traced back to 17th and 18th century debates that originally welcomed a 
liberal market economy (Hirschman 1997, 129). As Hirschman argued, “the 
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idea that men pursuing their interests would be forever harmless was decisively 
given up only when the reality of capitalist development was in full view” 
(ibid., 126). Moral challenges accompanied capitalism from the earliest days of 
its full evolution. One important strand of historical critique of capitalism, 
which became influential in the 18th and 19th century, was fueled by one of the 
oldest forms of restriction of economic development, the Christian (and also 
Muslim and Jewish) prohibition of usury. Originally aimed at all forms of 
“effortless income,” which also meant profits from trade or land rent, scholastic 
thought over the course of the Renaissance and Enlightenment had boiled down 
the concept of usury to the restriction of interest on credit only (Geyer 2000; 
Goede 2004). The historical evolution of usury prohibition paved the way for 
the perception that interest payments are a conceptually distinct and particular-
ly problematic form of profit. Moreover, the prohibition of usury very often 
meant that credit and lending lay in the hands of outsiders, which very often 
were Jews (although not as often as it is widely believed).1 This boundary 
between “normal” economic profit and morally and politically more problemat-
ic financial profit was influential in the 19th century in two different ideologi-
cal contexts: First, it defined one important cleavage within the European So-
cialist movement. Second, usury debates shaped the perception of the major 
economic crises of the late 19th century in European countries among liberals 
and conservatives, which later became radicalized by Fascist parties of the 
1920s and 30s. 
3.1 Finance and the Power over Capitalist Societies 
19th century Socialists in Germany and France witnessed a highly polemical 
and unforgiving debate between Karl Marx and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, which 
evolved around the role of market exchange and money for capitalist exploita-
tion. For the anarchist Proudhon, the ideal society meant the free exchange of 
small-scale producers. Without the imposition of power imbalances created by 
property rules, a system of natural prices and free exchange could evolve, in 
which every worker could earn the use value of his labor instead of just its 
exchange value (Proudhon 2012). In Proudhon’s view, financial profits in the 
form of interest payments were, very much like cartelization and/or renting 
land, exploitative and “parasitic” forms of rent-seeking that caused a permanent 
necessity for labor expropriation (Proudhon and Robinson 2003, 54). He ar-
gued that workers’ income, which is the overall sum of wages, would never be 
enough to buy all products in the market, as long as there is the obligation to 
pay interest and other forms of rent. Consequently, in his writings on French 
revolutionary action in the 1830s Proudhon advocated free credit and the creation 
                                                             
1  It is important to note that Jewish dogma prohibited usury as well, but only in regard to 
other members of the Jewish community and much less so for lending money to Christians. 
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of a People’s Exchange Bank to avoid harmful speculation. He also proposed 
that it is necessary that the central bank interest demands on paper money made 
surplus value institutionally obligatory for the whole economic system (Prou-
dhon and Senft 2012; Yuki 2013). Marx, in spite of having celebrated Prou-
dhon’s early critique of property as “theft” (Proudhon, Kelley and Smith 1994), 
wrote a harsh critique of Proudhon’s assumption about use value and exchange 
value (Marx et al. 1979). It is not possible, Marx argued, to separate money-
based commodity exchange in markets from exploitative relations in the pro-
duction process (ibid., 62).2 Marx’s critique culminated in the argument that 
Proudhon had not understood the historical character of market exchange and 
treated it as an anthropological constant – as economists do. Still, Proudhon 
provided a root for anti-financial protests on the left by claiming that the purely 
financial form of profit was exogenous to the processes of production and ex-
change.  
Later socialist debates about the banking sector also triggered a second moral 
economy root for later critics. It is the perception that over-proportionate politi-
cal power and control over the whole economy tends to accumulate in the 
hands of financial capitalists. Rudolf Hilferding was influential in claiming that 
capital concentration would be organized and controlled by “financial capital” 
(Hilferding and Adler 1971, 306), by banks and financial institutions. This will 
eventually lead to a power monopoly in the hands of banks. Hilferding argued 
that this could facilitate revolution because financial monopolists already control 
the social production and therefore provide the organizational tools for the 
socialization of all capital (Hilferding and Adler 1971, 503). From Proudhon to 
Hilferding, an important strand of socialist thought attributed to the profit 
gained by banks and financiers (1) an exogenous, exploitative character, and 
(2) a special role in controlling the political and economic dynamics of capitalist 
societies. 
3.2 Financial Critique in Conservative Anti-Liberal Thinking 
The two basic elements of financial critique that have been detected in early 
socialist discourse show similarities to conservative anti-liberal thinking in 
Germany and Great Britain in the late 19th century and the early 20th century. 
After the era of liberalization and laissez-faire optimism in Prussia and other 
German regions since the 1830s, the period between the founding of the Reich 
in 1871 and the turn of the century saw an anti-liberal backlash in German 
politics (Geyer 2005). In the context of the Gründerkrach (“founding crisis”) of 
                                                             
2  For Marx, the primary problem of capitalism is that for any form of market exchange goods 
have to be put into calculable relation. This makes it necessary to put the labor of individu-
als into equivalence, and there is no reason to believe that this exchange value of labor and 
goods can ever be in “natural” proportion to its use value and the needs of workers (Marx et 
al. 1979, 65). 
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the 1870s, the tightening of credit created problems primarily in agriculture and 
small artisan enterprises who felt an increasing burden of debt. This led to a 
growing public debate about Wucher (usury) and the perils of liberal economic 
laws. Geyer stresses that usury in that context meant much more than just inter-
est payments that were too high. Usury  
became a highly politicized slogan […]. The term became part of a divisive 
political code. Critics argued that the abolition of the usury laws marked the 
victory of what was disrespectfully called “Manchesterliberalismus” (Man-
chester liberalism). In fact, the rhetoric of Wucher implied first and foremost 
an attack on liberalism. (2005, 462) 
This was also the time of a broader anti-Semitism gaining influence on large 
parts of the conservative and liberal parties in Germany (Salzborn 2010, 320). 
The “gold standard” became a chiffre for liberalism, taken up by radical right-
wingers as the idea that a “Golden International” was as dangerous as the “Red 
International” (Loeffler 2012, 229).  
On the conservative side of the usury debate, the image that financial profit 
making is exploitative can be described as a deeper process of collective identi-
ty formation (Giesen 1999). For late 19th century conservatives, the dominant 
image was that outsiders, who brought in their liberal understanding of justice 
and law, had penetrated the national community and solidarity of workers and 
capitalists. Usury law was largely court case law, and a growing number of 
judges turned to concepts of “material justice, which was based on ethical 
standards and, from a juridical point of view, antiformal norms” (Geyer 2005, 
468). It is this distinction between ‘good’ community producers and ‘evil’ 
outsiders, who penetrate and exploit the economic well-being of the people, 
which lay at the heart of conservative anti-liberalism. This refers to what Gie-
sen describes as traditional community boundaries (1999, 398): The outsiders 
(the exploiting financial capitalists) do not understand and obey the habits, 
traditions, and rules of the community. They also have the political and eco-
nomic power to force a new form of contract law and economic government 
onto the nation. This concept of community contributed to a twenty year period 
of repelling liberal rights and intensifying regulation of stock and options trade 
until 1896 (Engel 2013).  
During the First World War and in the interwar period, the “usurer” as a 
chiffre for anti-community economic practices re-emerged in debates about 
“war profiteering” and “hoarding” of goods in the crises of the 1920s (Geyer 
2005). However, it was not before the 1920s that this image of “financial pow-
er and exploitation” was consciously used by German radical right-wing par-
ties, for whom it provided a link between their radical and broader anti-Semitic 
ideology and their critique of the gold standard and war reparations (Loeffler 
2012, 165). For the Nazis, as well as for nationalist and anti-Semitic groups of 
voters in the German population, their collective identity was defined by what 
Giesen calls a “primordial coding” of the community (1999, 397), in which 
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outsiders, here understood by radicals as a globally acting Jewish finance class, 
are described as dangerous and “contaminating” the national community. 
It is important to stress that these elements of right-wing moral economy of 
anti-financial protest were not only a German phenomenon. Loeffler (2012) 
points to the influence of the distinction between “producers” and “parasites” 
for 19th century British debate as well. One of the historical contexts for this 
was the seemingly liberal debate about the fate of the British Empire. Loeffler 
claims that there was an “overlap between critical and affirmative imperial 
ideologies” in reproducing the distinction between productive national capital 
and exploitative cosmopolitan finance (2012, 108). With the Empire being 
subject to political contestations and a growing self-confidence of its colonies, 
arguments were brought forward, in which the interests of British workingmen 
were plotted against “cosmopolitan” (ibid., 109) financial interests, for example 
in the tariffs debate. Moreover, there was a critical debate in which British 
wealth was described as created by “invisible” financial investors that came 
mainly from foreign loans, while the industrial structure of Great Britain was 
weakening (ibid., 115). Finally, economists such as J.A. Hobson or Arthur 
Kitson discussed underconsumption problems in this context. They saw capital 
export in the form of foreign loans as a major problem contributing to the Em-
pire’s crises. This also provided a historical context for Keynes’ famous cri-
tique of financial capital and his demand for the “euthanasia of the cumulative 
oppressive power of the capitalist to exploit the scarcity-value of capital” 
(2011, 164).  
In the interwar period, Britain witnessed the rise of the Social Credit Move-
ment led and inspired by Clifford H. Douglas. He saw the main cause of eco-
nomic crises in the need for all prices to not only cover production cost but also 
“bank charges and taxes” (Loeffler 2012, 184). Then he claimed that capitalist 
class struggle would be replaced by a struggle between finance on one side and 
capital and labor – in productive solidarity – on the other. He saw the scarcity 
of purchasing power as consciously created by private bank restriction of money 
and credit. In a surprisingly “Proudhonian” turn, Douglas claimed that credit 
should be “democratized” and given out freely by a National Credit Authority. 
It was supposed to rebate the gap between production cost and market prices to 
all customers. Again, we see the normative opposition between financial profits 
and community-based manufacturing of workers reproduced. British unions 
discussed, but rejected Douglas’ idea (Finlay 1972, 122), and the movement 
separated into a liberal part that tried further to persuade politicians and em-
ployers, and a radical part that formed the paramilitary “green shirt” move-
ment. The latter became associated with British Union of Fascists in the 1930s 
(Finlay 1972, 125ff.). Here, as much as in German Fascism, we see a primordial 
definition of the insider community, which is perceived to be violated and 
contaminated by exploiters from the outside who gain political control. Anti-
Semitism and populist “Anti-City” thought were married in British fascism. 
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To sum up, between 1870 and 1930 anti-finance movements on moderate 
national liberal, as well as radical right-wing side of the ideological spectrum 
shared the definition of two important boundaries between legitimate and ille-
gitimate economic practices,3 which had also been influential on leftist groups. 
First, financial interests were described as exploitative, even parasitic to the 
creation of economic wealth by labor in the production process. Financial prof-
its were seen as raised by outsiders of the social or political community, while 
inner-production conflicts between capital and labor were supposed to become 
less relevant. The difference between more and less radical perspectives de-
pended on the harshness of boundary drawing, as well as their linking to ethnic 
and racist aspects for describing the outsiders. Second, the financial industry 
was perceived as disproportionately politically powerful in comparison to 
manufacturing, with banks and investors exceeding a special governing capaci-
ty for capitalist economies, having higher influence on law and court action, as 
well as bearing a higher responsibility for turmoil and crises. With very few 
exceptions among conservatives,4 finance protesting became linked with anti-
Semitism, particularly strongly – but not exclusively – in Germany over the 
1920s and 1930s. This illustrates that there was a structural affinity between 
these two elements of moral economy of finance protesting and radical right-
wing thinking (Postone 2005).5 
                                                             
3  Both of which had also prominently figured within 19th century and early 20th century 
socialist debates. 
4  And even a remarkable number of leftists in semantical proximity. 
5  Moderate and radical conservative forms of capitalism critique share these two elements, 
but how likely does such financial critique turn into full-fledged anti-Semitism and nation-
alism? To re-formulate in collective identity terms: How likely is it that we will see a tradi-
tional insider-outsider boundary develop into a primordial? Historian Moishe Postone ar-
gued in an often-cited article on “Antisemitism and National Socialism” that there is a 
structural affinity between an economic ideology that focuses on finance and anti-
Semitism. Behind anti-financial arguments he sees a false distinction between a natural side 
(production and labor) and an abstract side (money) of capitalism (Postone 2005) at work. 
In conservative and right-wing ideology, dialectical relation between use value and ex-
change value, which transcends all economic practices in capitalism, is falsely projected into 
the opposition between production and money. From a Marxist perspective, populist anti-
financial critique uses money as an objectified symbol for the abstract value relations and 
opposes it to the physical process of production that is only seemingly natural. While in re-
ality, all production relations themselves are founded on the commodity fiction of labor and 
embody the problematic abstractions in itself. In right-wing anti-finance protesting produc-
tion is associated with the solidarity of a community or a people that is penetrated by the 
external logic and power of money. Postone argued that, particularly in Germany, this moral 
economy had a historical affinity to the lack of integration of Jews into the dominant cul-
tural definition of the nation (“Volk”). And it is the ascription of the abstract, monetary side 
of capitalism to the Jewish population that provided a much closer link between Nazi eco-
nomic thought and anti-Semitism than the historically limited role of Jewish people in the 
credit business. Therefore, the dichotomy of “producers vs. parasites,” that lay at the heart 
of anti-finance movements in the late 19th and early 20th century, has a structural affinity 
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4.  Occupy Wall Street in the Recent Financial Crisis 
The OWS movement originated from New York in the fall of 2011 and quickly 
developed into a broad international and worldwide protest network. It was not 
the first moment of economic protesting since the contemporary renaissance of 
global capital markets in the 1980s. In reaction to the widespread gradual de-
regulation of global credit and capital markets after Bretton-Woods in the 
1980s and 90s, protest organizations such as ATTAC have tackled financial 
practices in European countries since the mid-90s (Waters 2004; Uggla 2006). 
Financial capitalism became subject to public moral debates and protesting first 
in the developing countries struggling with austerity measures imposed by the 
IMF after credit and currency turmoils in the 1980s and 1990s (Waters 2004). 
Between 2002 and 2008 in Europe we have seen public debates about the prob-
lematic forms of financial investment practices pursued by hedge funds and 
private equity firms (Evans and Habbard 2008; Froud and Williams 2007; Proff 
2008; Münnich 2012). But it was not before the banking crisis of 2008 and the 
unprecedented cost of bail-out measures, that a major outcry and broad public 
debates about the legitimacy of contemporary financial capitalism evolved in 
Western countries (Münnich 2016, 2015; Grossman and Woll 2014). OWS was 
born in this context. It consisted of “a loose-knit coalition among activists with 
a variety of different primary concerns” (Calhoun 2013, 26). After failing to 
occupy the NYSE on September 17, the movement built a protest camp in 
Zuccotti Park, which lasted for two months before police dispersed it. The 
movement called for parallel movements, and similar camps were founded all 
over European countries, particularly in the different financial centers of Frank-
furt, London, Paris, and Madrid, in a coordinated protest day on October 15, 
2011.  
We will now look into the internal and public statements of the organization, 
posted on the different group websites. Most statements and arguments are 
taken from a comprehensive collection of press releases, blog and Facebook 
posts by OWS activists, which has been carefully gathered and edited by Lenny 
Flank (2011), a book that also presents statements of solidarity from other 
organizations such as trade unions or NGOs. Moreover, Flank presents written 
testimony of the discussions within the movement. Lars Geiges has provided a 
similar collection of texts in his study of OWS Germany (2014). Finally, online 
sources by OWS groups were added to the text sample. Sampling concentrated 
on texts that contain cognitive perceptions and normative evaluations about the 
relations of economic and political processes, describing either the problems of 
the present situation or providing proposals for a better economic order. All 
                                                                                                                                
to anti-Semitism and racism, but its concretization depends on the historical cultural con-
text of a population. 
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statements have been coded according to how they define illegitimate financial 
practices, particularly how they describe the behavior of financial investors and 
banks in economic and political regard and how they define the core problem 
of the present “system.”6 
4.1  A Moral Economy of the Occupy Movement? 
Are we justified in claiming that there was a “Thompsonian” moral economy at 
work in the OWS movement? Indeed, OWS statements gave concrete accounts 
of economic practices that are particularly worth protesting and state them 
against clear-cut understandings of legitimate economic action. One of the 
most cited and internationally copied documents by local OWS groups was the 
“Declaration of the Occupation of New York City” that was accepted by the 
NYC General Assembly (full assembly of the camp) on September 29, 2011. 
This document opens with a surprisingly concrete accusation: “They have 
taken our houses through an illegal foreclosure process, despite not having the 
original mortgage” (Flank 2011, 55). It then criticizes “exorbitant bonuses” 
paid by bailed out banks before it moves on to the broader questions of inequal-
ity, austerity, and discrimination. Both top issues in the declaration attack “ex-
cessive” economic practices, while at the same time they provide a positive 
evaluative background, reinstating the legitimacy of “normal” foreclosure and 
bonus payments if they are in line with the creation of growth and economic 
stability. There are many examples in which it is criticized that economic profit-
seeking has “crossed a line” and turned into “corporate greed” (ibid., 68), em-
ployees are “stripped” and indebted students are “held hostage” (ibid., 56). 
Moreover, there is the frequently cited label of “Wall Street CEOs” (ibid., 101), 
which suggests a moral differentiation between financially oriented and “nor-
mal” CEOs. Many statements seem to share the idea that the protest aims at 
excesses of contemporary capitalism and widespread “malpractices [German: 
Missstände]” (Geiges 2014, 106) rather than against the idea of capitalism 
itself. This fits the motivational statements by Adbusters that denounced the 
overthrow of capitalism as an “outworn utopical slogan.” They claimed that 
OWS should instead target “something that spotlights Wall Street’s financial 
capture of the US political system and confronts it with a pragmatic solution 
[…] like the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall Act […] or a 1% tax on financial 
transactions” (Flank 2011, 13). Demands should be “doable” and “practical.” 
Moreover, groups in all different cities were very eager to define the goals of 
                                                             
6  A methodological caveat is necessary here: The radical democratic conviction of the 
movement never allowed one particular group or person to issue “official” statements and 
speak publicly for the group as a whole – which also turned out to be a major strategical 
disadvantage for the movement. Therefore, we present arguments only that re-occurr in 
different OWS sources. 
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their movement explicitly, as well as to provide an analytical argument on how 
the political problems are based in distorted economic processes. 
4.2  “We” and “Them” – The Economic Outsiders 
The OWS movement was the “first mobilization that focused clearly on finan-
cial apparatuses that caused the crisis” (Calhoun 2013, 33). The most important 
and “brilliant framing” (ibid.) for all protest statements, was the opposition of 
“1%” against the “99%” percent of the population. The slogan did not only 
signal political majority, but also stressed the communal spirit behind the accu-
sations towards the “collusion of business and politicians” that was seen as 
“representative not of the people, but of banks and financial powers” (Della 
Porta 2015, 135). The outsider status of the criticized elites became clear in 
many statements. In one of the earliest calls for action on August 10, 2011, 
which begins prominently with the sentence “Something is wrong,” the image 
becomes clear: “We are subjected to the whims of those who hold power, those 
who live in a world different from ours” (Flank 2011, 10). The seventh official 
communiqué by OWS raises an argument that sounds historically familiar: 
“Fifty times as much speculative trading as commercial trading goes on each 
day in America. You are in debt to people who make money by moving money 
from place to place using computers” (ibid., 39). This statement claims that 
financial speculators do not have to work for their income, but “only” use com-
puters, a modern version of “effortless income.” They are seen as standing 
outside of the world and solidarity of working people.  
There is further evidence for this interpretation in the many solidarity ad-
dresses that unions sent to OWS. United Steel Workers claimed that they are 
“fighting these captains of finance who promote Wall Street over Main Street” 
(ibid., 64) and AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka slashes the “corrupting of 
our politics by business and financial elites. The people who do the work to 
keep our great country running are being robbed, not only of income, but of a 
voice” (ibid., 86). Financial actors are described as standing outside of the 
community, not because they own firms or are rich, but because they earn their 
profits via illegitimate practices, living from exploitation of the value that others 
have created. It is important to note that the trade union statements are not 
directed towards financial actors only, but also towards “business elites” in 
general. However, with very few exceptions, all examples of illegitimate prac-
tices of profit seeking in the OWS material focus on financial transactions. 
The harsh incongruence between the socially financed bail-out and the bo-
nuses paid out to financial actors clearly was seen as a symbol for a self-
externalization of the wealthy “1%”, as a pars pro toto for the “mix of greed 
and irresponsibility” (Piven 2012, 61) of the present political-economic order. 
The Congressional Progressive Caucus claimed that Wall Street is only benefit-
ting the “super wealthy” (which suggests a difference to “normal wealthy”) 
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while exploiting the “overwhelming majority of Americans.” And the Retail, 
Wholesale and Department Store Union argues that “corporate greed is respon-
sible for harming the lives of millions of working people and unemployed 
people” (Flank 2011, 68). The Philadelphia Council of the AFL-CIO used a 
remarkable rhetoric to stress the outsider position of the “greedy 1%” (Della 
Porta 2015, 136):  
For too long, Corporate America has gotten rich through financial speculation, 
shady investment schemes, crooked mortgage deals, and systematically driv-
ing down the standard of living of American workers. When Wall Street’s 
bubble of greed finally burst, they came to the American people for a handout. 
(Flank 2011, 100) 
In this argument, the attacked financial corporations are not part of the Ameri-
can society, but have to approach the American taxpayer “from the outside,” as 
much as they caused the crisis in their own world. As the initial statement of 
Occupy London states: “We refuse to pay for the banks’ crisis.” Homes are 
“being stolen by faceless conglomerations motivated only by profit” (Flank 
2011, 40).  
It is clearly observable here that the historical insider-outsider separation is 
reproduced, which identifies all problematic economic practices as carried out 
by outsiders who do not value or even understand the habits and moral rules of 
the social community. Linked with that is a return of the 19th century belief 
that formal law cannot protect material justice, the definition of which is inti-
mately linked with the symbolic boundaries of community and belonging. 
Formal law won’t help to find “real” justice as long as lawmaking and courts 
are controlled by money: “They have spent millions of dollars on legal teams 
that look for ways to get them out of contracts in regards to health insurance” 
(ibid., 56). Many statements argue that the 1% favors “self-interest over jus-
tice” (ibid., 55). This relates to the material concept of justice by placing the 
moral responsibility for the financial dynamics at the doorsteps of banks. How-
ever, from a liberal, contractual understanding of justice, the many ordinary 
people from within the community, who raised high mortgages, invested in 
problematic pension plans or over-debted themselves with consumer credits 
would have to be described as equally responsible. Still, in OWS statements, 
the insiders did not contribute to the exploitation problem. Here similarities to 
the usury debate of the 19th century are apparent. 
OWS and its supporters reproduced the historical image of financial capital-
ism according to which industrial entrepreneurs and workers, who used to 
cooperate in solidarity and a shared sense of justice, are undermined by an 
external elite that used power resources and liberal law to exploit and appropri-
ate power and wealth by “robbing,” “stripping,” “selling off,” or “reckless” 
profit-seeking. A boundary is drawn between (morally acceptable) financial 
transactions, credit, and savings, as part of the daily work and ordinary con-
sumer life, and financial transactions that are pursued for profit reasons only, 
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which is seen as synonymous to disentangling from the national community. 
Adbusters saw an attack on the whole nation: “Western industrialized nations 
are now being masticated by the financial monster they themselves created” 
(Flank 2011, 13). However, this last statement also points to an important dif-
ference to historical framings. It stresses the role of politics in supporting the 
rise of finance, therefore the “monsters” do not come from the outside but have 
been created by political insiders. The “1%” is described as a group that lives 
widely remote from the solidaristic and communal relations of the national 
society. Thus, the outsiders are not characterised by substantialist social mark-
ers such as inherited class, nationality, or ethnicity. Instead, they are described 
as people who voluntarily opted out to serve their greed. Even though outsiders 
are not necessarily financial investors, but also large corporation CEOs, all 
concrete illustrations of exploitative and anti-social practices involve transac-
tions on the financial markets.  
4.3  “Power” vs. “People” – The Monopolization of Control 
The second dimension of 19th century moral economy was the idea that finan-
cial actors exert a disproportionately high degree of power over most important 
economic and political processes. Many instances of that image can be found in 
OWS statements. There is a high range of arguments to describe the financial 
power of politics, which reach from “collusion” to a “dictatorship of the 
wealthy.” This is visible in concepts such as “financial captains,” who steer the 
economy like a ship or rob the people of their voice (see above), or if the OWS 
goal is described as “breaking up the cozy relationship between money and 
politics” (Flank 2011, 17), as well as the “collusion of business and politics” 
(Della Porta 2015, 135). As OWS Germany stated: “Stock markets, financial 
actors and corporations decide the fate of whole countries and dictate policies 
to governments” (Geiges 2014, 106). While concrete political demands and 
their prioritization were strongly debated among activists, there was a shared 
perception according to which “[p]oliticans seemed a distant elite and political 
power organized to serve corporations and the wealthy, not ordinary people” 
(Calhoun 2013, 33-4). Control of politics and media is also defined as a goal in 
important sections of the September 29 Declaration: 
We come to you at a time when corporations […] run our governments. […] 
They have used the military and police force to prevent freedom of the press 
[…]. They determine economic policy […]. They purposefully keep people 
misinformed and fearful through their control of the media. (Flank 2011, 56) 
Even the politically more modest London movement, described the differentia-
tion between state regulators and those whom they should regulate as a crucial 
issue of political power (Occupy London 2011). In some statements, we find a 
full-fledged historical narrative about how economic wealth always and inevi-
tably turns into political power. 
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Money, it has been said, has taken over politics. In truth, we say, money has 
always been part of the capitalist political system. A system based on the ex-
istence of have and have nots, where inequality is inherent to the system, will 
inevitably lead to a situation where the haves find a way to rule, whether by 
the sword or the dollar. (Flank 2011, 21f.) 
This statement is as much compatible with traditional left-wing class struggle 
arguments as it is with right-wing financial critique. However, in the context of 
the OWS movement, the line between manufacturing and financial activities 
interferes with a sectoral definition of the class who rules over the working 
people: “the financial elites want to dictate the future of our entire economy” 
(RWDSU7 statement in: Flank 2011, 68). In a striking passage of the second 
issue of the London OWS newspaper “Occupied Times London,” the following 
representative statement can be found: 
And over and over again, a small clique of obscenely rich men and women sneer 
and tell us that we’re in this together as they use a crisis caused by those that 
fund them as an opportunity to further increase their wealth. (Hardy 2011, 9) 
While the author describes the problem of inequality as a general problem 
across all economic sectors, financial market actors appear as those who fund 
the “1%”, which suggests that they control them. It is the special power posi-
tion ascribed to monetary operations and capital trade as being (even) more 
influential on criticized political decisions that invokes the historical argument 
of financial power over politics.  
However, the contemporary “financial elite” is not solely identified with 
economic actors, but also, in many statements, involves critique and mistrust 
directed at international organizations (Della Porta 2015, 138), such as the EU 
or the IMF, in their role for the deregulation of global capital markets and 
austerity measures in the crisis. This intermingling of distrust for international 
politicians and financial elites alike has, in her comprehensive study of protest 
movement in Arab and European countries, led della Porta to the conclusion 
that protest movements after 2008 signal  
A crisis of democracy as well as, or even more than, a financial crisis. Above 
all, the protesters criticized the ever more evident shortcomings of representa-
tive democracies, mirroring a declining trust in the ability of parties to channel 
emerging demands in the political system. (Della Porta 2015, 153) 
From our point of view here, we come to a different conclusion. At least in the 
OWS movement, moral economy and political protest seem to be linked much 
closer than della Porta suggests. The deficiency of the democratic process is 
described as caused by “transnational business outsiders” of the community 
who, even if they are not all financial actors, are described – very much like in 
19th century Britain – as a new “cosmopolitan elite.” These groups are be-
                                                             
7  Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union (RWDSU). 
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lieved to have gained their resources from their commitment to global financial 
capitalism logics, be it in a bank, a multi-national corporation, or an interna-
tional capital market-friendly organization. Still, wherever economic practices 
are described as responsible for the perceived problems they are exclusively 
related back to illegitimate financial economic practices and “shareholder 
thinking.” Even where large manufacturing corporations are attacked for their 
political power, the problem seems to be their engagement with shareholder 
value or financial exploitation instead of production orientation. It is never 
capital gained from, for example, successful IT innovations or a sales increase 
in automobile manufacturing that is cited when capital is wrongfully used for 
the control of politics. Instead, it is almost always the problematic “financial 
capitalism money” that shows the tendency to dominate politics. 
5.  Conclusion 
This article was provoked by the question if we live in a second “Polanyian 
moment,” in which a crisis of global financial capitalism and the following 
austerity policies spark social counter-movements with nationalist and/or au-
thoritarian ideologies, as it had happened in late 19th and early 20th century. 
We have contributed to this debate by examining the moral economy of protest 
movements. This translated into the empirical question if the OWS movement 
of 2011 showed similarities in the cognitive and normative boundaries they 
drew between legitimate and illegitimate economic practices to conservative 
and right-wing anti-finance protest in the late 19th and early 20th century.  
It seems to be quite unlikely that leftist protest movements that attacked aus-
terity measures should themselves make argumentative use of elements of 
conservative critiques of capitalism. However, our content analysis of public 
statements within the OWS movement in Germany, UK, and the U.S. has 
shown that two core elements of historical anti-financial moral economy fig-
ured prominently in OWS protest framing. First, we have seen the re-occurring 
boundary between “productive” and “exploitative” forms of profit-seeking, 
linked with drawing a line between insider and outsiders to the community. 
From this perspective, the dominant struggle in capitalism lies between the 
morally good, physical, “natural” labor-based production on the national level 
and the abstract and exploitative practices of “cosmopolitan” money users that 
show no identification with their community. We have argued that in historical 
conservative anti-finance protesting this involved traditional collective identi-
ty, in which the (financial) outsiders are foreigners who are not acquainted to 
the customs and habits of the community and need to be coerced. Over the 
course of the 1920s, radical right-wing and anti-Semitic parties in Germany and 
Britain used the same pattern for primordial identity building, which involved 
the ideological association of financial transactions with Jewish communities 
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as a violation or contamination of the national community. We did not find 
similar codings in OWS statements.  
However, we could clearly observe the cognitive pattern that associated fi-
nancial profit seeking with a social world that is completely remote from that 
of the “99%” community. The coding of collective identity formation in these 
statements is, however, very different to the 1890s to 1930s: Outsiders are seen 
as business elites who used to belong to the nation but have voluntarily opted-
out for profit reasons. OWS statements reproduced the distinction between 
production communities on the one hand and financial activities that try to 
exploit it on the other, but in contrast to the past, there seems to be no cultural 
or ethnic cleavage that is treated as congruent with the “producers vs. exploi-
ters” dichotomy. Financial exploitation refers to a moral boundary between 
different forms of economic practice, very much in the sense of Thompson’s 
concept of “moral economy.” These practices are symbolically defined as 
leading perpetrators into a remote social world distinct from that of the ordi-
nary population. This coding allows drawing boundaries between illegitimate 
and legitimate practices within the manufacturing economy (“Wall Street CEOs 
vs. entrepreneurs”), as well as within the financial sector (“savings and invest-
ment” vs. “pure profit seeking”).8 Finally, even political organizations that 
regulate capital markets globally, such as the IMF or the EU, become identified 
as members of the exploitative “financial elite.” Still, the principal distinction 
between “national solidarity of producers” and “exploitative financial practices” 
is very much alive and reproduced all over OWS statements. Therefore, they 
still semantically reproduce the conservative dichotomy “production vs. money.”  
The second historical element of anti-financial protest was the perception 
that financial actors have the capability of capturing political power and use it 
to gain political control at the expense of the self-determination of the people. 
German, as well as British and other European right-wing parties, had used 
both elements to attract large parts of democratic constituencies to their anti-
Semitic ideology.9 Already in the 19th century these groups of businessmen 
were seen by conservatives (and many socialists) as a group of outsiders who 
use their wealth to capture the political process, dictate finance-friendly eco-
nomic policies, and block all democratic demands for wealth-sharing and mar-
ket regulation. Especially with regard to this assumed “dictatorship” of eco-
nomic policy, the similarities in OWS statements to the anti-financial rhetoric 
                                                             
8  This supports results from other studies that have shown a definition of “legitimate bank-
ing” that emerges from recent financial debates (Münnich 2016). 
9  From a long historical perspective these moral economy elements of financial critique have 
always been closely linked to anti-Semitic stereotypes and fueled pogroms. However, in the 
specific context of Germany’s distorted process of nation-building and its internal conflicts 
of the 20th century, this European cultural heritage of anti-Semitic thinking and violence 
became more deeply intermingled with the economic anti-finance ideology than ever be-
fore and anywhere else, particularly in Nazi ideology.  
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of the 19th and early 20th century are striking. Again, stable currencies and 
free trade, as well as liquidity and avoidance of credit default by central banks, 
are seen as interests of a very small elite (1%) only, which are imposed onto the 
political system via corruption, money-based lobbying and the spread of con-
tractual justice in courts. However, it is again important to stress a difference in 
the OWS perceptions: At least to some degree, the power position of finance in 
contemporary capitalism is described as politically induced rather than a de-
terministic effect of financial capital accumulation.  
Summing up, there seems to be a semantical affinity between the anti-
financial moral economy of the Occupy movement and the anti-finance protest 
movements of the first era of global financial markets. This historicity of pro-
test cognitions about legitimate economic orders illustrates a conceptual prob-
lem in the sociology of justification. While the normative principles of justifi-
cation may be universal “worlds” rooted in grand paradigms of political 
philosophy, “reality tests” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 37) are also shaped 
by historically resilient cognitions of economic and political orders that ‘spin’ 
social critique towards historically resilient perceptions of protest. The social 
critique that drives social movements towards social or institutional change is 
itself a historical legacy, which probably is also influenced by institutional 
paths and economic structures over time (Münnich 2016), biasing protest to-
wards the normative and cognitive ideas of the past.  
As for the Polanyian question, we do see important differences in protest 
codings that render it doubtful that the “1%” will too easily be associated with 
a concrete ethnic, religious, or other group for political radicalization. Outside 
powers are the dominant framing, but they are seen as a group of economic 
actors that is defined by their conduct rather than by socio-demographic char-
acteristics. This voluntaristic turn in the aligning of anti-finance frames to 
collective identities in the 2011 movement is the major difference between then 
and now. However, we have to admit that the semantic elements of “financial 
exploitation of a national production community” as well as the “usurpation of 
democracy by money” are very much alive in the OWS movement. In this 
primary focus on financial practices and money, the Occupy movement has 
reproduced older images of financial critique to a larger degree than other 
comparable movements such as ATTAC or the anti-globalization movement.10 
This may detract public critical attention from the wider macro-economic and 
macro-social factors that have fostered financial boom and turmoil. It may also 
be prone to sharper and more radical forms of collective identity building. 
Therefore, the widespread success of right-wing populism may not be fully at 
                                                             
10  This may also have to do with a particular problem of framing that movements face when 
they want to tackle the highly technical and interrelated problem of financial market regu-
lation. Thus, the mentioned organizations have often shied away from focusing their cam-
paigns on these issues. 
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odds with OWS protests. Still, we need to understand better the political and 
institutional conditions under which Polanyian counter-movements are likely to 
hit one or the other ideological direction and critical framings shift. I doubt that 
the grandmaster of economic history has solved this problem for us. 
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